dc.contributor.author |
Andel*, Todd R. |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Fritzke, Austin |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Humphries, Jeffrey W. |
|
dc.contributor.author |
McDonald, J. Todd |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2018-07-31T08:45:43Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2018-07-31T08:45:43Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2014 |
|
dc.identifier.issn |
2210-1519 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://journal.uob.edu.bh:443/handle/123456789/1760 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
While AES is computationally secure, it is not without weakness. Side-channel attacks on AES hardware implementations can reveal its secret key. Because of this vulnerability, countermeasures to side-channel attacks are crucial to data security. This paper assesses a current design and proposes a new design for securing AES, along with evaluating their implementation onto field programmable gate arrays. Both countermeasures were successfully implemented, and the data remained secure against common side channel attacks. Results indicate successful obfuscation of the secret key over the original AES algorithm. |
en_US |
dc.language.iso |
en |
en_US |
dc.publisher |
University of Bahrain |
en_US |
dc.rights |
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International |
* |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ |
* |
dc.subject |
Side-Channels |
|
dc.subject |
FPGA |
|
dc.subject |
DPA |
|
dc.subject |
AES |
|
dc.subject |
Countermeasure |
|
dc.title |
Design and Implementation of Hiding Techniques to Obfuscate Against Side-Channel Attacks on AES |
en_US |
dc.type |
Article |
en_US |
dc.identifier.doi |
http://dx.doi.org/10.12785/IJCNT/020203 |
|
dc.volume |
02 |
|
dc.issue |
02 |
|
dc.source.title |
International Journal of Computing and Network Technology |
|
dc.abbreviatedsourcetitle |
IJCNT |
|