A Novel Matching Framework For One-Sided Markets In Fog Computing

Abstract

Resource allocation is a challenging task for every researcher in fog and cloud computing. This problem has been widely studied in a fog computing environment where there is a constant need for resource allocation. Many mechanisms have been proposed for buying and selling of resources where one or both sides give their preferences over each other. However, the challenge of allocating resources becomes difficult if the service provider wants to pick their most preferred user. In such cases, the users may also consider forming a coalition to improve their overall welfare in a cooperative environment. In this scenario, we have proposed a novel matching mechanism named as stable fog resource allocation (SFRA) in the fog computing environment. To the best of our knowledge, this highly possible framework of allocating resources based on preferences in cooperative and non-cooperative fog environment has not been proposed before. First, the proposed mechanism is studied in the paper then its implementation is donewith and without a coalition.